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The electricity systems have a central role to play in the transition 
towards a low carbon economy and integration of renewable energy 
sources in the European Union. However, the European electricity 
networks face a diverse set of existing and new risks that can hamper 
the energy security of the member countries. This paper aims to 
qualitatively and quantitatively assess these risks given the changing 
operating framework of the industry characterised by market 
liberalization and network interconnectedness in the EU. Within this 
context, we primarily focus on the risks from exceptional events and 
threats to the European electricity systems. A simple ex-ante risk 
assessment matrix is proposed to gauge the network risks and take 
prevention measures against them. Such assessment can be a useful 
approach for policymakers and practitioners amidst the existing ex-post 
reliability and quality of supply performance standards and indicators. 
Our analysis suggests that economic risks pose the most serious and 
challenging to the evolving European electricity system.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Electricity plays a vital role in the development of all economies because of its dual 
role in the economy. It is an indispensable intermediate input factor in production 
and a necessary final consumption good. Hence, the availability of electricity 
supply at an uninterrupted manner matters and remains a major energy policy 
goal of all economies. The economic, social, and political costs of electricity supply 
disruptions or fluctuations can be entrenched with adverse macroeconomic 
consequences. The adverse impacts arising from electricity supply fluctuations can 
only be mitigated by ensuring a secure supply across the potentially competitive 
segments (generation, retail) and the regulated natural monopoly segment 
(transmission and distribution networks) in a reliable and affordable manner. 
Past debates on security of supply (or energy security hereafter) have heavily 
focussed on the availability of energy sources (Winzer, 2012; Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2008). This implies that security of supply has traditionally come to be defined in 
terms of fuel availability or network reliability. However, there are also emerging 
concerns with regards to the security of the electrical systems (physical delivery of 
energy sources) and the integrity of its operation (robustness, reliability and 
resilience of networks) in the wake of several natural, accidental and human 
conceived external threats and events (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008). These external 
events can be natural (such as natural calamities and severe weather conditions), 
accidental (such as explosions and nuclear accidents) or human-engineered 
malicious threats (such as terrorist attacks, sabotage and vandalism and 
coordinated cyber-attacks,). 
These natural, accidental and malicious threats can be termed as ‘low-frequency, 
high-impact’ (LFHI) events. The LFHI events are characterised as having low 
probability of occurrence but with the potential to cause significant and long-term 
catastrophic damage to the bulk power system and the economy of many countries 
(NERC, 2010)1. As such, the risks from exceptional events can transcend other 
types of risks facing the electric sector due their magnitude of impact. For example, 
the vulnerability of electricity networks from LFHI threats was vividly exposed 
with widespread power outages or failures during the period 2002/03-2004/05 
                                                          
1 This is to say that the LFHI events, in general, have low likelihood of occurrence and high 
magnitude of impacts although the measurements for each threat in terms of occurrence and 
impact vary within each category of the threats being natural, accidental or human-tailored.  
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across the UK, Italy, and North America (Bompard et al., 2011)2. In addition, the 
economic damages due to Japanese power failures in March 2011 in Fukushima in 
the wake of an earthquake and subsequent tsunami underscore the need for 
protecting the electrical systems and grids based on a thorough ex-ante risk 
assessment from inevitable natural calamities. However, the risks of damage from 
severe weather conditions are not likely to decrease in the foreseeable future. 
Long-term climate change and extreme weather conditions will continually 
challenge and test the reliability, resiliency and robustness (the 3 R’s) of energy 
infrastructure in many European countries. 
Likewise, the risks of national or international malicious attacks are another well-
perceived LFHI threat. An attack on the substations or transmission networks can 
provide the possibility of engendering a major blackout and adversely impacting 
the functioning of other inter-dependent critical infrastructures and networks such 
as telecommunications, gas and waterworks. This is because electricity networks 
power much of the infrastructures in advanced economies and thereby creates a 
‘ripple effect’ of economic, social and environmental damage post-attacks (Douglas, 
2005). While the existing grids are in the process of being digitalized and getting 
‘smart’ for efficiency improvement reasons; it also invites a new and increased risk 
of threat through isolated or coordinated ‘cyber attacks’ (Tritschler and Mackay, 
2011).  
The distribution networks stand rather vulnerable as they bear around 90 percent 
of power failures while around 10 percent of power failures are caused by failures 
in the transmission system (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). However, the rarity of 
the occurrence of these events complicates the process of making any probabilistic 
estimates in foreseeing the occurrence of likely threats and prepare against them 
accordingly. There also exists limited operational experience in handling the risks 
engendered by LFHI events while economic tools such as cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA) may not be adequate to internalise their impacts in long-term risk 
protection planning models. 
Furthermore, the lack of clear conceptual frameworks concerning energy systems 
security can act as obstacles in designing proper security measures against 
external threats in energy networks. However, the aim of this paper is to identify 
the potential risks and threat indicators faced by the electricity networks in the 
light of on-going technological advancement and their existing energy policy goals. 
Identifying the risks arising from various natural, accidental and malicious threats 
                                                          
2Hurricane Katrina of the 2005 Atlantic hurricane season was the costliest natural disaster that 
completely halted the functioning of several critical infrastructures including the electricity 
systems. It is also one of the five deadliest hurricanes, in the history of the United States. There 
were at least 1,836 casualties in the hurricane and total property damage was estimated at 
$81 billion (2005 USD) (Virginia, 2009). 
4 
 
to the European electricity networks in the context of increasing market 
liberalisation and integration through interconnectedness is a first step towards 
protecting against them. This is especially relevant from a policymaking 
perspective as the conventional literature on energy security has traditionally 
focussed on the security of fuel supply in the generation segment with the 
networks receiving little attention. This research aims to bridge such gap. 
We proceed with the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 of the paper 
analytically discusses the concept, conventional measures and existing indicators 
of security of supply. Section 3 identifies a list of core set of security of supply 
indicators concerning electricity networks. These indicators are further 
quantitatively analysed and discussed in relation to some specific European 
economies in Section 4 while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Security of Supply: A Conceptual Overview 
 
Security of supply (SES) is amply defined and used across the literature (Winzer, 
2012). This is expected because energy security concerns many aspects that are 
vital to all economies while it lacks a well-defined idea which involves more than 
one scientific discipline (Loschel et al., 2010). The varying sources and nature of 
risks coupled with the difficulties in assessing the severity, certainty and scope of 
impacts can further blur and complicate the concepts and understanding of energy 
security issues. As such, it has no widely agreed upon definition for two major 
reasons. The primary reason is that security of energy supply is a multifaceted 
issue with rather varied, interrelated and often complex notion involving the 
diversity and difficult nature of the issues to be considered, and the requirement to 
consider them in a holistic manner (Bazilian and O’Leary, 2006). Hence, defining 
energy securities under stricter terms can become a complicated and controversial 
task. Secondly, the definitions of SES are often broad and not well-targeted while 
the security of the electricity system as a whole hinges upon the level of security 
across each segment in electricity sector. The aim of this paper is to conceptually 
address these concerns in understanding the security of supply in electricity 
networks and help policy making accounting for the risks from external threats. 
In general, security of supply is commonly implied as the continued availability of 
energy relative to effective energy demand (Winzer, 2012). For example, the UK 
Department of Energy and Climate Change focuses the definition of energy security 
around the continuous availability of commodity supplies (DECC, 2009) while the 
European Union(EU) definition extend this concept to include welfare aspects such 
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as the impacts on the environment or the society in terms of sustainability 
(European Commission, 2000). Thus, energy security encompasses addressing the 
risks related to the scarcity and diversity of primary fuels (which is the 
production/generation aspects) and the operational reliability of energy systems 
(which includes the network aspects) to ensure that their services are delivered to 
end users in an affordable manner (Blyth and Leferre, 2004). Hence, it is inevitable 
that security of energy supply includes both issues of quantity, quality, and price of 
energy. Likewise, the risks and threats associated with each segment are related 
across the whole system while the integrity and operation of the system as a whole 
improves by abating the level of risks across different segments. However, past 
studies of energy security are primarily concerned with the physical availability 
and delivery of fuel supply in generation. This implies the availability of energy 
among the end consumers is unconditional upon the health of critical components 
of the electricity supply industry (ESI) such as the transmission and distribution 
networks. 
Considerable emphasis is constantly placed on creating a diverse energy and 
electricity system amidst the growing confusion on what actually should be 
diversified (Grubb et al., 2006). It is generally believed that greater diversity 
enhances the robustness of an electricity system to fossil fuel supply shocks 
generating economic and security of supply benefits while also promoting network 
resilience (Bazilian and Roque, 2008). However, the diversity of an electricity 
system is wrongly interpreted both in qualitative and quantitative terms (Roques, 
2003). Stirling (1994, 1998) argues that diversification is an investment allocation 
technique in modern electricity systems where uncertainty and ignorance rather 
than risk dominate the real electricity investment decisions.  
As such, diversity can be understood from three necessary perspectives that 
include variety, balance and disparity (the nature and degree to which the options 
are different from each other) (Bazilian and Roques, 2008). Variety is the number 
of diverse categories of ‘option’ into which a system may be allocated while 
balance is a function of the allocation of the energy system across various 
identified options (Stirling, 1994). Disparity refers to the manner and degree in 
which energy options may be distinguished (Runnegar, 1987). Thus, ceteris 
paribus, system diversity increases with greater variety of distinct types of energy 
option; the more even the balance across energy options and the more disparate 
the energy options. The understanding of diversity based on such threefold 
classification places disparity at its heart while each of these property helps 
constitute the other two (Stirling, 1998). Although each of these aspects is 
necessary, they are insufficient properties of diversity. Table 1 shows that previous 
studies have used varying aspects of the threefold classification in order to 
understand diversity. 
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Aspects of Diversity Name/Reference 
Variety Category count (MacArthur, 1965) 
Balance Shannon evenness (Pielou, 1969) 
Variety/Balance Shannon-Wiener (Shannon and Weaver, 1962), 
Herfindahl/Simpson (Simpson, 1949), Gini (1912), 
Hill (1973) 
Disparity Weitzman (1992), Solow and Polasky (1994) 
Variety/balance/disparity Junge (1994), Awerbuch(2006), Stirling (2007) 
Table 1: Aspects of diversity considered in prior studies 
Source: Stirling (2008) 
 
However, it is necessary to consider that diversity in itself is not a sufficient 
criterion to guarantee the security of the whole system. As such, diversification of 
energy sources is just one of the many security of supply strategies. It is important 
that critical infrastructure such as that for long transmission networks are 
continuously reviewed for properties of resilience in the face of several natural, 
accidental and malicious threats (JESS, 2004). Nonetheless, in the face of 
uncertainty and ignorance, an important insight to have emerged from a number of 
sciences is that diversity provides resilience to systems exposed to such 
incertitude (Grubb et al., 2006; Awerbuch, 2006). Alongside, it is important to 
acknowledge that there exist more energy security strategies apart from 
diversification even though diversification is often viewed as the dominant means 
to energy security (JESS, 2006). 
Another widely used approach in conceptualizing security of supply primarily 
involves constructing indicators to assess the risks and associated costs in terms of 
fuel imports dependence, political instability and resource estimates. This is 
particularly important in the European context as energy imports and its 
transportation (for example, natural gas) can originate from politically unstable 
regions in the face of increasing energy demand. In addition, the creation of a 
common internal market for electricity exerts extra importance on the cross-
border flow of electricity across countries. This will require more economic and 
political cooperation across economies along with an improvement in the overall 
quality of electricity networks considering the growing demand for electricity. 
De Jong et al. (2007) measure the short-term responsiveness to an energy crisis 
with measures of security of internal energy supply and stability of the energy 
transport system as a measure of security of external supply in their index. This 
allows accounting for import risks which in reality is a component of overall 
security of supply index. Le Coq and Paltseva (2009) incorporate the concepts of 
risks and costs by constructing the risky external energy supply index (REES) and 
the contribution to EU risk exposure index (CERE). Likewise, Roller et al. (2007) 
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construct a general energy security index by dividing the net energy imports on 
the total energy consumption in which both the external energy supply and the 
internal energy supply are taken into account. Turton and Barreto (2006) 
incorporate the concept of long-term energy security by emphasizing the 
importance of the availability of the domestic energy sources. 
Similarly, Loschel et al. (2010) construct ex-ante and ex-post set of energy security 
indicators by including the relevant risks and costs. Lesibrel (2004) and Bazilian 
and Roques (2008) have argued that the mean variance port-folio theory (MVP) 
can be applied to assess the trade-off between risks and costs in the generation 
mixes or to the wider energy system. However, MVP is an optimisation tool rather 
than an indicator for security of supply in itself. Jamasb and Pollitt (2008) suggest 
market mechanisms as an efficient tool for allocation of resources and balancing of 
supply and demand at times of scarcity. 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has developed two set of indicators 
incorporating the concepts of ‘resource concentration’ and ‘stresses’. The IEA price 
component indicator shows the energy security implications of resource 
concentration while the physical availability component indicator incorporates the 
physical availability aspects of energy security. It is generally considered that the 
indicators established by IEA are the most influential set of indicators in 
measuring the security of energy supply (Loschel et al., 2010).  
While these indicators primarily assess the SES in generation in terms ‘quantity 
risks’ and ‘price risks’; the security of supply in the context of liberalized energy 
networks is unaddressed. The liberalisation of energy markets across the 
European Union and the subsequent energy policy objectives of creating an 
affordable, sustainable and reliable energy supply have placed greater challenges 
and pressures in the existing energy networks. The increase in international 
electricity trade coupled with the transition towards a greener economy exacts for 
considerable resources to be devoted in the design, maintenance and upgrade of 
existing networks for a secure energy supply. Interconnections of networks 
require extreme coordination among participating countries. The 6 blackouts that 
occurred in 2003 within 6 weeks impacting upon 112 million people in the US, UK, 
Denmark, Sweden and Italy demonstrate that increased cross-border trade of 
electricity resulting from the liberalisation of the electricity supply industry was 
not accounted for in the assessment of system security. Bailek (2004) states that 
the 2003 blackouts in the Western countries were primarily transmission-related 
and occurred due to the technical failure in the networks. These blackouts did not 
occur from generation inadequacy or shortages of primary fuels. Hence, it is 
generally believed that the frequency and scale of such blackouts is likely to 
intensify in the current context of liberalisation and privatisation due to increased 
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competition, scale of operation and cross-border trade of electricity (Thomas and 
Hall, 2003; Yu and Pollitt, 2009). Table 2 summaries the major transmission 
related blackouts that occurred in 2003 in terms of location, duration, population 
affected, economic costs and interrupted energy. 
 
Nature of 
Blackouts 
North 
America 
England Croatia Scandinavia Italy 
Date August 14, 
2003 
August 28, 
2003 
January 12, 
2003 
September 
23, 2003 
September 
28, 2003 
Location USA and 
Canada 
South 
London 
Southern 
Croatia 
Sweden and 
Denmark 
Italy 
Population 
affected 
50 million 0.41million N/A 4 million 55 million 
Duration 2 days 30 minutes N/A 8 hours 18-24 
hours 
Economic 
costs 
4-10 billion 
US dollars 
N/A 0.002375 
billion US 
dollars 
N/A N/A 
Interrupted 
energy 
62000 MW 724 MW 1270 MWh 6550 MW 17 GWh 
Table 2: Major blackouts in 2003 
Source: Bompard et al. (2011)3 
 
While the causes of the blackouts affecting the transmission networks vary; the 
economic costs of security of supply interruptions are large. This justifies the need 
for attention that modern electricity networks require in delivering a secure 
supply of electricity. The case is especially true in Europe where it has become 
evident that the European electricity market is characterized by underinvestment 
in cross-border transmission capacity and by a reluctance to carry out costly 
upgrades of power technologies which can improve the service quality (Yu and 
Pollitt, 2009). These characteristics have coincided with the advent of 
liberalisation, unbundling, of the sector, privatization and new centralized and 
distributed energy technologies. However, changing climate and weather impacts 
also remain a major risk facing the electricity networks which needs to be 
accounted for in the evaluation of system security along with other threats 
(natural, accidental and malicious) and events.  
A common and accepted way of accounting for various threats and events in 
evaluating the electricity system security is to assess the risks of security of supply. 
The risks assessment can be qualitative or quantitative while the sources of risks 
can be diverse. Qualitative risks can be quantified by assigning some clearly well-
                                                          
3 Please note that the data for interrupted energy is available with inconsistent units as reported in 
Table 2. 
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defined values. However, the value that a certain risk takes can vary across 
countries as the perception of risks arising from a particular thereat or 
circumstances can vary significantly across them. We include four broad 
classifications of risks in this study, namely i) economic risks, ii) technical risks, iii) 
topographical risks, and iv) social risks facing the electricity networks. The 
valuation of these risks in either qualitative or quantitative terms allows us to 
construct a ‘security of supply’ indicator concerning the European electricity 
networks.  
 
3. Identification and Assessment of Network Risks 
 
Energy security remains one of the topmost energy policy goals in the EU (see EU 
Directive 2009/73/EC). However, the transition towards a low carbon economy, 
the 2020 renewable targets and the need for cross-border interconnections in 
achieving a common internal market for electricity imply that energy security 
needs to be comprehended with these inter-related policy goals. The EU electricity 
market currently comprises of 41 transmission system operators (TSO’s) from 34 
countries covering about 300,000 km of transmission lines. Around 530 million 
people are served by these transmission lines across Europe. Figure 1 shows the 
map of high voltage transmission grid across Europe and the existing 
interconnectedness among member states. However, regional integration of 
wholesale electricity markets via increased interconnection, while promoting 
security of supply, also exposes the system to the threats of ‘cascading failures’ that 
can occur both within and among the interconnected networks.  
The European electricity networks consist of a mixture of overhead lines and 
underground cables of varying voltages and include various system points and 
substations. The substations are responsible for voltage transformation and 
include the switching and control equipment. However, the long distance (mainly 
transmission) and short-distance (vastly distribution) electricity networks across 
Europe face many risks and challenges with the advent of liberalisation, ambitious 
climate change targets, increased distributed generation and digitalization of the 
grid. Most importantly, the risks arising from natural calamities, adverse weather 
conditions and social unrest cannot be over-looked. The risks to the existing 
electricity networks can be classified as (i) economic risks, (ii) technical risks, (iii) 
topographical risks and (iv) social risks depending upon the causes and sources 
where they originate from. An enhanced understanding and assessment of these 
risks is a useful ‘qualitative indicator’ to assess the system security which can 
nonetheless be quantified somehow. 
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3.1 Economic risks 
Electricity networks (both transmission and distribution) are traditionally 
considered to be natural monopolies because their cost structure (high fixed costs 
relative to operating costs) implies that it is more cost efficient that the market is 
served by a single firm than many firms. Thus, they need to be regulated (Newbery, 
1999). However, it is also the case that distribution networks while being regional 
monopolies in physical terms often have a ‘market’ for distribution services and 
activities (Saplacan, 2008). The networks being ‘natural monopolies’ are thus 
subject to economic regulation in terms of price, entry and service quality across 
Europe creating its own risks. 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of European high voltage transmission grid 
Source: Adapted from GENI (2011) 
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i) Lack of adequate investments 
It is observed that quality of service (Q0S) is correlated with the amount of 
spending in general and investments in networks in particular (Joskow, 2008). 
Thus, QoS is an integral indicator of overall security of supply in the networks. 
Service quality in networks mainly involves two major aspects: continuity of 
supply and power quality. Continuity of supply is measured in terms of number 
and duration of planned and unplanned interruptions due to network failures. In 
the face of decaying and old electricity networks across Europe, the lack of 
investments can result in power losses, increase unplanned interruptions due to 
system breakdown and increased episodes of planned outages also increase due to 
frequent maintenance and upgrade. Power quality, on the other hand, requires the 
maintenance of constant voltage in the absence of which significant costs can be 
incurred due to damage to equipment.  
The transformation from vertically integrated centralised electricity systems to 
liberalised and competitive electricity markets have led to the issue of investment 
inadequacy in electricity networks across Europe. The European Commission 
estimated in 2007 that the realisation of the European energy policy targets will 
require 750 billion euros to be invested in electricity infrastructure over the next 
three decades (Skoczkowski, 2007). This will involve around 90 billion to be 
invested in transmission networks and 300 billion in distribution networks. 
However, the desired level of investments has not been achieved. The inadequacy of 
investments in the electricity networks can be perceived as a regulatory ad policy failure 
of the liberalized market structures across EU. 
The lack of adequate investments in the networks implies that interconnection 
capacity between European member states is insufficient and bottlenecks exist 
within and between the countries in the fluid transmission of electricity. Likewise, 
the prevention of the grid against extreme weather conditions and other external 
threats coupled with the digitalization of the grid may require the adoption of 
sophisticated technologies which involves additional investments.  
In centralised energy systems, the optimisation of investments can be achieved by 
coordination and command and control (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2008). However, this 
is not the case among the European countries due to increasing liberalised and 
decentralised structure of the regulated electricity markets. Thus, the role of 
market design and regulatory framework can be crucial in addressing the 
investment adequacy issues in liberalised European electricity markets. This is 
discussed separately below.  
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Role of regulation towards investments 
Liberalisation of the electricity markets has been on the agenda in the power 
sector of many European countries since 1990. Hence, the key features and 
operating environment of the sector has been changing. The industry no longer 
remains vertically integrated but rather unbundled (i.e. vertically separated) while 
the nature of vertical separation varies across countries in functional, legal and 
ownership terms. Competition has been introduced in the potentially competitive 
segments while the natural monopolistic network segments, in the absence of 
competition, remains economically regulated to mimic market mechanisms and 
promote efficiency improvements (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2007).  
In particular, the primary goals of regulation in improving the security of supply in 
liberalised electricity markets is to attract adequate and timely investments, 
promote adequate maintenance and ensure efficient operation of existing network 
facilities and create sufficient incentives for innovation and technological progress 
(Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005).The electricity networks across the European countries 
are regulated by independent regulators. An independent regulator acts as the 
custodian of public interests (Armstrong et al., 1992). The regulators decide the 
amount of revenue to recover under regular time intervals (also called regulatory 
lag). Historically, cost-based regulatory approach was used by many regulators to 
regulate the network charges. It is argued that the cost-based regulation (also 
commonly known as the rate of return (ROR) regulation) is efficient for generating 
short-term investments but at the expense of long run efficiency. This is because 
the rate-of-return regulation deviates from cost-minimization (also termed as the 
Averch-Johnson effect) in the long-run (Averch and Johnson, 1962; Vogelsang, 
2002). Likewise, the experience with price-based models suggests that price-based 
regulation is effective for short-term cost reductions and efficiency improvements 
but maybe less effective for long-term investments (Brunekreeft, 2009). 
However, it is possible to encourage network investments with more market-
based mechanisms and incentives mechanisms such as merchant electricity 
transmission networks (Joskow and Tirole, 2005). Such incentive laden price-
based regulation is popularly known as ‘incentive regulation’. The regulator has a 
pivotal role in ensuring adequate network investments while not letting the prices 
rise via the incentive regulation (Pollitt and Bialek, 2008). The network charges in 
many EU countries are now subject to incentive-based regulation. The incentive-
based schemes encourage the network utilities to undertake cost savings. 
However, the striving for cost savings may result in lower service quality as 
maintaining or improving upon a given level of quality of service is costly and 
possible only at certain spending levels (see Ter-Martirosyan, 2003). A recent 
study by Jamasb et al. (2012) suggest that while the incentive schemes established 
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by the regulator to encourage utilities to reduce network energy losses leads to 
improvement in sector performance, they do not provide utilities with sufficient 
incentives to avoid power interruptions in the UK. However, the state of the 
current European electricity network suggests that not only the size but the timing 
of investments are crucial in ensuring a secure supply of electricity. The transition 
to the smart grids, likely adoption of electric vehicles and the likely widespread 
integration of distributed and renewable energy into the grid clearly heightens the 
importance of the size and timing of investments and the role that the regulator 
has to play. 
In addition, it is also necessary that the appropriate incentives are incorporated in 
the regulatory mechanism to create additional support for the grid to be protected 
at times of extreme weather other external threats. The regulator faces a 
challenging task of designing an appropriate mechanism to allocate the costs of 
increased investments among different users in the regulated networks. As such 
the role of regulator is likely to increase in the context of liberalised EU electricity 
markets.  
 
ii) Growth in electricity demand 
Electricity demand is expected to increase in the European Union. It is estimated 
that the demand for electricity will range within 3530 TWh to 3795 TWh by 2020 
than 2856 TWh in 2008 (Ruska and Simila, 2011). Germany, France and the UK 
were the largest electricity consuming countries in 2008 while combined 
electricity consumption totalled 356 TWh in the Nordic electricity market area 
comprising Denmark, Norway, Finland and Sweden. The transport sector is 
expected to play a major role in driving up the electricity demand in Europe. It is 
estimated that around 1.5 million electric cars (plug in hybrids and battery electric 
vehicles) will be running on the European roads by 2020 (Rankin, 2010). Thus, 
electric cars alone could increase the European electricity demand by 3% as 
compared to the 2006 levels. The adoption of the electric vehicles on a large scale 
can change the nature of the electricity demand as power demand can increase in 
select hours of the year. This trend can increases the ratio of system peak loads to 
average loads and falling capacity utilization leading to rising electricity costs. Such 
trend will exacerbate the need to build new generation plants and transmission 
lines in the face of rising average costs because of the need to pay for capital that is 
idle most of the time (MIT, 2011). Similarly, the increased use of air-conditioning 
(AC), computers and electric gadgets of varying shapes and sizes have catapulted 
electricity demand in the face of growing capacity constraints in generation. 
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The rising electricity demand is a major challenge and poses considerable risks to 
the already congested European electricity grid. Grid congestion leads to a 
deterioration in the quality of service due to frequent power outages. The ‘price 
risks’ also remain as congestion can drive the electricity price higher at peak times. 
In the light of market liberalisation, cross-border trade of electricity remains an 
undisputed option to satiate and balance national electricity demand across the 
European countries. Hence, whenever a large load is placed on the inter-connected 
network, the adverse effects can spread along a large area. Voltage fluctuations can 
occur as suppliers try to balance out demand or loads by reducing the voltage 
across the networks (Hammond and Waldron, 2008).  
One of the factors of past blackouts across Europe and North America in the early 
2000 was primarily caused by network failures due to high demand pressure in 
the grid. It is also likely that electricity demand will continue to rise for a 
foreseeable future. In addition, a study by Eskeland and Mideksa (2010) show that 
an increase in temperature has an impact on electricity consumption four times 
the size of the equivalent decreases in temperature in Europe. Thus, electricity 
consumption will be a crucial factor in the adaptation towards climate change 
effects in the wake of future temperature changes.  
 
3.2 Technical risks 
Electricity is a non-storable product and requires the real-time balancing of 
demand and supply at all times. Electricity networks also need to accommodate a 
range of technologies such as distributed generation, electric vehicles, etc. and fuel. 
Hence, technological aspects remain central to the effective functioning of the 
network and hence the effective supply of electricity. In the light of technological 
developments involving the electricity networks, different risks can arise from 
such technological transitions as discussed below. 
 
i) Distributed Generation 
Significant economies of scale and reliability are the major advantages of 
centralised electricity production. However, such system is also prone to 
environmental and security of supply issues justifying the adoption of distributed 
generation (DG). DG is predominantly site-specific in relation to energy resources 
and demand. It refers to the energy supply close to the point of use by way of 
‘distributed energy resources’ (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). DG is slowly 
gaining pace across the EU member states as the liberalization of energy markets 
has created environment conducive for its promotion. One of the features of DG is 
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the flexibility that allows consumers to respond to changing market conditions 
because of their small size and shorter lead times in construction as opposed to 
centralised electricity systems. Devising and deploying mechanisms to provide 
incentives for investment in flexible generation and for operating flexibly within 
the system will become increasingly important as the penetrations of DG sources 
increase across the EU countries (MIT, 2011). 
However, the adoption of DG to a wider network can pose certain risks to the 
existing distribution networks. This is because the existing networks are not 
designed for decentralized supply and thus can be technically challenging. High 
penetration of DG has the capability to complicate the design and the operation of 
the existing distribution systems. A major shock or disturbance anywhere in the 
network can instantly affect the power quality throughout the network and hence 
requires careful monitoring to keep it stable. DG connections are also likely to 
affect the system frequency. The absence of load-frequency control equipment 
implies that DG operators are likely to rely on the transmission network operator 
or the regulatory body to maintain system frequency. This can be risky and 
thereby the connection of DG to the network in the absence of suitable back-up 
arrangements needs to be cautiously assessed against such technical challenges.  
 
ii) Diverse Generation Technologies 
Mitigating adverse impacts of climate change and improving the security of supply 
in generation require a significant switch towards low carbon energy sources in 
Europe. This has led to an increase in adoption of renewable energy generation 
across the EU member states. The EU countries in 2007 decided to meet 20% of 
the overall EU generation from renewable sources. Diversification of energy 
sources also adds to network resilience (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). However, 
major changes to the electricity network are needed to meet the European 
renewable targets while maintaining high service standards and reliability. This is 
because the growing use of renewable poses three major challenges across the EU 
involving i) the need to connect many new generators to the grids, ii) the need to 
upgrade the system to deal with intermittent electricity supply and iii) the need to 
connect small generating plants to the distribution network rather than the 
transmission grid (Hammond and Winnett, 2006). 
 
The interruption in the supply of renewable energy sources can affect the stability 
and harmonics of the whole system in terms of fluctuating frequency and voltage. 
Hence, it can affect the way the electricity system operates with twin major 
impacts on balancing costs and the reliability costs. The balancing impacts relate to 
the rapid short-term adjustments needed in order to manage the variability in 
energy supply (energy fluctuations) over the time period. This can only be 
achieved in the presence of a flexible grid affecting the operation and economics of 
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electricity networks. In addition, the threats and risks resulting from the absence 
of needed changes in power system planning and risk management, distribution 
and transmission related planning, operations planning and interface between grid 
and diverse generation techniques cannot be undermined in the face of growing 
integration of diverse generation technologies in the grid (PSERC, 2010). 
 
The reliability aspect relates to the extent to which generation will be available to 
meet peak demands. In the absence of adequate supply, the TSOs are obliged to 
ration the demand creating additional stress to the grid. Most importantly, the 
integration of renewables to the grid takes place with the help of power electronics 
converters that integrate the renewable sources to the grid in compliance with 
power quality standards. However, high frequency switching of inverters can inject 
major harmonics to the system creating severe power quality problems if not 
implemented properly (Khadem et al., 2010). Hence, efficiently increasing the 
penetration of grid-scale and diverse renewable generation while maintaining 
reliability require modifications to existing European power system design and 
operation. In addition, processes for planning transmission system expansion, 
allocating facility costs, and, particularly, siting cross-border transmission facilities 
will need to be reformed as interconnectedness increases in the EU (MIT, 2011). 
 
While diversified generation technologies sources can add to network resiliency if 
connected to the grid, it can generate several security of supply risks in the 
absence of properly designed electricity networks to accommodate them in the 
face of growing intermittency of electricity supply. However, it can be expected 
that the adoption of smart grid will enable a larger integration of renewable 
sources and distributed generation across the European electricity systems. 
 
iii) Smart Grid Technology 
Electricity networks across Europe are facing a major transformation as the need 
to integrate more renewable energy, improve energy efficiency and allow more 
consumer control over their energy consumption increases. The ‘smart grid 
technologies’ is expected to deliver these goals as smart grid planning is relatively 
at an advanced stage in Europe. The smart grid  is expected to deliver three major 
benefits  namely (i) facilitating the transition towards a greener economy with 
significant use of renewable energy, (ii) by creating an efficient grid that increases 
the surplus of the consumers through greater energy efficiency, and (iii) enabling 
technological innovation that creates jobs of the future and new opportunities 
(Chopra et al., 2011). 
 
According to the European Network of Transmission system Operators (ENTSO-E), 
“smart grid” is the process “to transform the functionality of the present electricity 
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transmission and distribution grids so that they are able to provide a user-oriented 
service, enabling the achievement of the energy policy targets (2020 and beyond) 
and guaranteeing, in an electricity market environment, high security, quality and 
economic efficiency of electricity supply”. Thus, smartness is not an objective in 
itself but rather a set of tools for achieving the 20/20/20 targets (Chaniotis, 2011). 
Nonetheless, the smart grid will create a power network that is more reliable, 
flexible, secure and efficient using smart devices and automation technologies. 
 
However, the realisation of smart grid will require major investments in new 
technology and spending in research and development (R&D). This implies that the 
technology is fully prone to suffer from the economic risks of underinvestment. 
The increasing price of rare metals which form a critical component for a variety of 
smart-grid technologies because of a very limited global supply can deter the 
widespread adoption of those technologies across Europe and the US. As many 
new devices get connected to the grid, it also increases the threat surface with 
every new connection. As smart grid comes online, the increased risks of cyber-
attacks will be among the main risk and challenge that the technology will face. 
This is because the technical threats related to cyber security such as malware, 
sensible information theft; traffic injection, etc. imply vulnerabilities of 
communication and information systems that are capable of shutting down the 
large areas of power generation plants in Europe (ENISA, 2012). Hence, there is a 
strong dependency between smart grid security and security of supply in the 
European electricity networks (Tritschler and Mackay, 2011). 
 
While the future of the grid looks certainly smart, the risks and new challenges 
faced by these electricity networks to overcome will also become apparent. The 
cyber security risks and challenges associated with smart grid will require 
additional focus on data and information security requirements, large number of 
smart devices, legacy and secure communication protocols, synergies with other 
critical infrastructures such as utilities etc. implying several smart grid security 
challenges (ENISA, 2012). Moreover, it can be expected that smart grids can 
facilitate the transition towards a sustainable and secure electricity supply in 
Europe by overcoming the infrastructural and operational challenges evolving the 
European electricity system. 
 
3.3 Topographical risks 
 
Topographical risks are those risks arising mostly due to the general location of 
the place and too little can be done towards their mitigation. For example, Italy is 
among the most seismically active countries in Europe as it lies directly above the 
Eurasian and African fault lines where the two tectonic plates meet. Factors such 
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as severe weather conditions and natural calamities also fall into this category. 
Table A in the Appendix reports that 1.1% of outages in the US are weather related 
while lightning also contributed to a mere 1.1% of outages. However, the main 
approach to mitigate the economic impacts from such risks in times of occurrence 
is by adapting to them through suitable prevention measures.  
 
Weather remains a major challenge for the European electricity networks and the 
problem is likely to aggravate considering the growing climate change concerns. 
Immediate effects can be observed in terms of increases in temperature and 
precipitation with predicted increases in sea level rise and storm surge. For 
example, electricity transformers face new type of risks as temperature thresholds 
will be surpassed. More often, temperature rises can result in increased sag of 
transmission lines, increase in the number of underground fires and manhole 
explosions fuelling the outage frequency, extent (customers lost) and duration 
(Zimmerman and Faris, 2010). Long term changes in annual precipitation can also 
lead to the corroding of the network equipment. Likewise, increased rainfall can 
pose a significant threat to the substations and may also damage the underground 
cable systems. For example, it is reported that the power outage that occurred in 
the UK during 2007 affecting Yorkshire and Gloucester arose due to substation 
flooding when high water levels reached critical paths at some substations (ENA, 
2011). Thus, in the wake of evolving climate change concerns, the EU electricity 
networks are required to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change. 
Furthermore, the growth of weather dependent renewable and distributed 
electricity generation in the future will place major challenges across the EU 
electricity networks.  
 
Overhead power lines are also particularly susceptible to severe weather 
conditions such as wind storms and lightning. The 2003 Italian blackout was 
caused by the severe weather storms that damaged the power lines from Italy to 
Switzerland (ENEL, 2011). Similarly, the vulnerability of the European power 
networks was also exposed when Scotland was affected by strong winds in the 
name of hurricane ‘Bawbag’ on December 5, 2011. The hurricane blasted several 
wind turbines and brought down several overhead power lines with 400 separate 
incidents disrupting the electricity network across Scotland. It is estimated that the 
economic losses from the power disruption amounted to about 100 million pounds 
(BBC, 2011). 
 
Securing the infrastructures such as electricity networks against severe weather 
can be challenging. This is because it is difficult to make a probabilistic estimate on 
the likelihood of occurrence of these events as most of these events occur rarely. 
However, events such as extreme weather (high speed storms, heavy snowfalls, 
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etc.) and floods may be easy to predict using complex meteorological forecast as 
exists in many European countries. Adoption and innovation of sophisticated 
technologies can be crucial towards safeguarding the grids against external 
threats. For example, automated hydraulic wind power plants can be in windy 
areas like Scotland such that the plant responds to the speed of the wind by 
varying its height. However, this may require additional spending but also in 
research and development (R&D). Inadequate investments in-itself remains a 
larger economic risk facing the EU electricity networks aspiring to be modernized. 
The regulatory practice and regime will prove to be a significant factor to shape 
the future of European grids against several challenges in the light of investments 
inadequacy in electricity networks.  
 
3.4 Social risks 
 
A social risk refers to those risks arising from unstable societal conditions. It 
includes aspects such as terrorist attacks (including cyber-attack), civil war and 
political instability. These events can largely affect the critical infrastructures of 
the nation such as electricity networks. This is because the critical infrastructures 
can be a prime target of the disgruntled masses to vent their dissatisfaction. Most 
importantly, certain equipment and components of the grid are crucial and 
installing them can be costly due to high sunk costs involved and greater time 
required. For example, high-voltage transformers are one of the unique assets in 
the grid. It can happen that unique assets are targeted by angry mobs which are 
very costly and can take one to two years to procure, build and install (POST, 
2004).  
 
Electricity powers much of the critical infrastructures of the industrialized nations 
such as EU from telecommunications to waterworks (Douglas, 2005). Hence, an 
attack on the networks can halt the functioning of major infrastructures such as 
transportation, communication, hospitals etc. However, the networks can also face 
the risk of domestic terrorism apart from or including international terrorism. Civil 
war and political unrest often become targeted and vandalised at times of these 
events although it happens quite rarely in Europe. Such acts of terrorism bear the 
potential of only causing short-term blackouts. It is proposed that decentralized 
generation can ensure increased security of the grid over a rather long-term 
implementation period because any single attack on the grid would have a lesser 
impact on the grid as a whole when a major proportion of distributed generation 
are installed (Hammond and Waldron, 2008). Nonetheless, the threats of 
international and domestic terrorism vary across countries. 
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The adoption of the smart grid implies that the growth of data flowing through the 
electricity grids is likely to exceed the growth of electricity flowing through them 
(in percentage terms) over the next two decades. In the future, the communication 
networks will become highly interconnected along with high physical 
interconnection of the EU electricity networks. Hence, the increasingly ICT reliant 
future grids are likely to expose its own set of vulnerabilities that may not be 
existent in today’s grid. Millions of new communicating electronic devices such as 
automated meters to synchrophasors will introduce attack vectors (paths that 
attackers can use to gain access to computer systems or other communicating 
equipment) that increase the risk of intentional and accidental communications 
disruptions (MIT, 2011). 
 
The threats from non-physical attack such as ‘cyber attacks’ and hacking to the 
grids is set to increase as the networks gets digitalized in the future. A successful 
‘cyber-attack’ can allow the hackers to disable grid protective relays and gain 
control over the parts of the network (Douglas, 2005). As such, cyber-attack on the 
electric grid remains one of the serious short-term threats in the US today as 
reported by the American Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). A recent study by 
Galvin Energy Initiative (GEI) reports that most of the outages in the US that 
occurred at the distribution levels were caused by the acts of the public 
contributing to 1.2% of the total power outages (Rouse and Kelly, 2011). The 
problem is certainly set to spread and aggravate across the EU in the future. 
 
Table 3 shows a simple risk assessment matrix based on the different risk 
dimensions identified in this paper. These risks can be assessed qualitatively using 
an ordinal approach such as low, moderate or high. However, one may also take a 
cardinal approach and quantify the risks accordingly. For example, low risks can 
take a score from 1-3, moderate risks can take a score from 4-7 and high risks can 
take a score from 8-10 in a scale of 1-10. For a single country case, the overall risk 
score will be the sum of the risks valued across all dimensions divided by the 
number of dimensions. Moreover, it is possible to assign weights to individual 
dimensions and take the weighted average for cross-country comparisons. This is 
necessary because the valuation and perception of the risks is different across 
countries at a given time as these risks are largely country-specific. For example, 
the threats to critical infrastructures from terrorist attacks are perceived to be 
higher in the US than Luxembourg. 
 
On the other hand, risks can also be classified as short-term or long-term. Short-
term risks engender short-term impacts while long-term risks produce lasting 
shocks to the system. For example, threats to the networks from civil unrest and 
political instability can short-term risks while threats from weather and natural 
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calamities can be a continued long-term risk. As such, the old risks associated with 
vertically integrated power systems are falling while new types of risks are 
emerging in the wake of a more liberalised and interconnected EU electricity 
markets.  
 
 
Risks Aspects LOW MODERATE HIGH 
Economic  Inadequate investments, 
demand factors 
   
Technical  Distributed generation, new 
technologies, smart grids 
   
Topographical  Weather, natural calamities 
 
   
Social  Terrorism, political instability, 
civil unrest 
   
Table 3: Risk assessment matrix 
Source: Own compilation 
 
 
4. Existing Indicators and Measures of SES in the European 
Electricity Networks 
 
 A secure supply of electricity can only be possible in the presence of a robust, 
reliable and resilient grid. QoS is one of the important ex-post performance 
indicators to currently assess the security of supply of electricity networks among 
the EU member states. Quality of service encompasses three different quality 
dimensions: (i) voltage quality, (ii) commercial quality, and (iii) reliability (CEER, 
2008). Voltage quality includes a variety of interruptions to the power system as 
already discussed above. Most of the network-related interruptions occur in the 
medium voltage (MV) and low voltage (LV) distribution networks (Keller and 
Franken, 2006). Commercial quality is associated with individual agreements 
between the consumers and the distribution companies while reliability includes 
network adequacy and security. Adequacy is the availability of sufficient network 
capacity to guarantee a continuous supply for electricity to the consumers in the 
longer run while security is the ability of the grid to withstand interruption (i.e. 
resiliency) in supply under adequate network capacity. 
 
The most common quality of service indicators to assess system reliability in 
Europe across the distribution networks includes SAIFI, SAIDI and MAIFI. They are 
defined and understood as below: 
 
22 
 
 SAIFI stands for System Average Interruption Frequency Index. It is 
estimated by dividing the number of customer interruptions by total 
number of customers served and thereby measuring the number of outages 
experienced by users. 
 SAIDI stands for System Average Interruption Duration Index. It is obtained 
by dividing the sum of long interruption duration (i.e. longer than 3 
minutes) by the total number of customers. Hence, this measure is a proxy 
for the average amount of time that customers are interrupted. 
 CAIDI stands for Customer Average Interruption Duration Index. It is 
expressed in minutes per interruption and can also be obtained as the ratio 
of SAIDI and SAIFI. 
 
Other measures of reliability across the EU distribution networks include 
Momentary Average Interruption Frequency Index (MAIFI) which is conceptually 
similar to SAIFI, Average System Interruption Duration Index (ASIDI), Average 
System Interruption Frequency Index (ASIFI), Customer Average Interruption 
frequency Index (CAIFI), TIEPI and NIEPI.4 
 
Likewise, reliability of the transmission grid is mostly assessed through Energy 
Not Supplied (ENS)5 and Average Interruption Time (AIT). ENS is the total amount 
of energy that would have been supplied had there been no interruptions while 
AIT is the measure for the amount of time the supply is interrupted. Other 
indicators also include measures such as Average Interruption Frequency (AIF), 
Average Interruption Duration (AID), System Average Restoration Index (SARI) 
(see CEER, 2008). Table 4 shows the various reliability indicators used to assess 
the performance of the grid in selected European countries. 
 
Country Index 
France SAIFI, ENS, AIT 
Germany SAIDI, SAIFI 
Italy SAIDI, SAIFI, ENS, AIT 
Netherlands SAIDI, SAIFI, CAIDI 
Hungary SAIDI, SAIFI 
Luxembourg SAIDI, SAIFI, ENS 
UK CI, CML 
Denmark SAIDI, SAIFI, ENS 
Table 4: Network reliability indicators in selected EU countries 
Source: CEER (2008) 
 
                                                          
4
In the UK, Customer Interruption (CI) is used instead of SAIFI which is calculated as 100*SAIFI. 
Likewise, Customer Minuets Lost (CML) is a synonym for SAIDI in the UK. 
5 ENS is a synonym for END in Lithuania. 
23 
 
Table 5 reports the SAIFI and SAIDI reliability indicators for some European 
countries and the US accounting for major events. In the US, each customer is likely 
to encounter about more than 2 hours of interruption (on average) and is likely to 
face about 1.5 interruptions. These numbers are comparably larger than its 
European counterparts such as Denmark where each customer on average faces 
about 24 minutes of interruption with the chances of 0.5 outages. Similarly, each 
customer in Germany faces an average outage of 23 minutes as the country boasts 
of having the most reliable power grid in Europe. The average number of outages 
that a customer faces is highest in Spain and Italy (2.2 times). The length of 
interruptions that each customer is likely to face is also the highest in Spain with 
104 minutes on average. Likewise, UK also faces a lengthy interruption with each 
customer likely to face about 90 minutes of outages on average.  
 
Country SAIDI (minutes) SAIFI 
USA 244 1.49 
Austria 72 0.9 
Denmark 24 0.5 
France 62 1.0 
Germany 23 0.5 
Italy 58 2.2 
Netherlands 33 0.3 
Spain 104 2.2 
UK 90 0.8 
Table 5: Reliability performance with major events 
Source: Rouse and Kelly (2011) 
 
Thus, we can infer that the reliability performances across the European countries 
are currently diverse and rather heterogeneous. The primary reason behind such 
heterogeneity is that the causes of interruptions (or risks of outages) largely vary 
across these countries. Weather can be a fundamental factor in countries like UK 
(Scotland in particular) and Spain while other topographical factors such as 
earthquakes can be influential in Italy which is prone to earthquakes. Most 
importantly, aging electricity infrastructure remains a central problem in many EU 
countries as the grid consists of aging power equipment, obsolete system layout, 
outdated engineering and old cultural values leading to old planning, engineering 
and operating of the system (Willis et al., 2001).  
 
Thus, there exists a significant potential to improve the security of supply by 
enhancing the reliability statistics of the transmission and distribution networks in 
Europe. Figure A in the Appendix reports the time-series statistics on number of 
unplanned interruptions per year for selected European countries. Finland 
experienced more interruptions in 2001 where the number of interruptions is 3.5 
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more than in 2000 and 2002. Likewise, the number of interruptions for Italy in 
2003 is one more than the interruptions occurred in 2004. 
 
‘Exceptional events’ is the synonym for ‘major events’ in Europe. It includes 
exceptional weather conditions and other exceptional circumstances such as 
accidents and natural calamities that can affect the continuity of supply for long 
periods even if they occur rarely. Figure 2 is a time-series presentation of all 
unplanned interruptions that occurred among several European countries over a 
time period from 1997 to 2007 across the high voltage (HV), medium voltage (MV) 
and low voltage (LV) networks accounting for ‘exceptional events’. It can be seen 
that the blackout and load shedding of 2003 resulted in high minutes lost in Italy. 
Severe autumn storms contributed to high value of minutes lost in Finland and 
Hungary during 2001. 
 
 
Figure 2: Unplanned Interruption including all events (minutes lost per year) 
Source: CEER (2008) 
 
In addition, severe storm conditions in the southern parts of Sweden resulted in 
extremely long interruptions in Sweden during 2005. Excluding these exceptional 
events would mean that the average minutes lost in the countries considered due 
to unplanned interruption would range between 50 to 250 minutes per year as 
shown by the figure below. Furthermore, it is clear that annual variation for the 
number of interruptions is less than the annual variation for the minutes lost 
among the European countries. Hence, it is deducible that extreme events result in 
longer interruptions rather than more interruptions in the European context.  
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The regulatory approach in accounting for ‘exceptional events’ tends to vary across 
the European countries (CEER, 2008). In some, the concept does not exist as in 
Czech Republic and Finland. The different types of exceptional events in practice 
and their definition, the situations classified as exceptional events, whether 
exceptional events are visible in the interruption statistics and whether they are 
excluded from any compensation payment varies among the European countries. 
 
Table 6 demonstrates the definition, classification and treatment of exceptional 
events in selected European countries. In most countries, exceptional events do 
not automatically qualify to receive compensation payments. Only the UK, Finland 
and Norway have some provisions of making companies eligible to receive 
compensation payments when exceptional events occur. Likewise, Slovenia, the 
Netherlands and Luxembourg do not explicitly report the interruption statistics 
due to exceptional events while Poland and Slovenia account for them in the 
statistics since 2009.  
 
Country Designation Concept 
Who 
classifies? 
Included in 
interruption 
statistics 
Eligible to 
receive 
compensatio
n payments 
France Exceptional 
event 
simultaneous 
interruption for 
more than 
100,000 end users 
TSO6 and DSO Yes No 
Finland  The concept of 
exceptional event 
does not exist 
  Yes, but 
interruptions 
longer than 
12 hours are 
compensated 
Germany Force 
Majeure 
Natural disasters, 
terrorist attacks 
and war, legal and 
official orders 
Jurisdiction, 
National 
Regulatory 
Authority 
Yes No 
Italy Exceptional 
conditions 
periods 
Based on 
statistical 
exploration and 
computational 
algorithm by NRA 
DSO Yes No 
Czech 
Republic 
 The concept does 
not exist 
   
Denmark Exceptional 
event 
Hurricanes and 
floods 
Regulator Yes No 
United 
Kingdom 
Exceptional 
event 
Weather and non-
weather related 
NRA Yes Yes, only is 
some 
situations 
Table 6: Definition and Treatment of exceptional events in some EU countries 
Source: Adapted from CEER (2008) 
                                                          
6
TSO stands for Transmission System Operator while DSO stands for Distribution System Operator. 
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Similarly, the entities included under ‘exceptional events’ considerably vary across 
the EU members. Countries like Romania, Poland, the Netherlands, Hungary, 
Germany and Estonia explicitly include terrorist attacks and wars under 
exceptional events while Denmark and Austria only include natural disasters such 
as hurricanes and floods. For Sweden and Slovenia, the concepts of exceptional 
events are rather vague and broad. Sweden defines exceptional event as ‘any 
events outside DSO’s control’ while Slovenia only considers ‘more severe condition 
than the network requirements’. Thus, it is lucid that the regulatory approach in 
accounting for ‘exceptional events’ differ vastly between the European countries. 
In addition, it would be of interest to establish whether those countries explicitly 
regulating these events have performed better than the non-regulating ones. 
 
Another set of ex-ante indicators to assess the performance of the transmission 
and distribution networks is the fraction of energy generated that is lost during the 
transmission and distribution process. Losses, in general, are measured as the 
difference between energy generated and energy delivered to customers. Hence, it 
does not include losses due to theft. However, theft is not considered to be 
important in the U.S. as well as in the wealthy EU countries today due to strong 
governance and (de)institutionalization towards theft. Moreover, in Europe losses 
consume between 4 to 16% of the electricity generated while the differences 
between the European countries in terms of average T&D losses are very high from 
4.4% for Sweden to 16.1% for Romania (ERGEG, 2008). Most of the losses occur at 
the distribution grids than the transmission grids in Europe.  
 
Figure 3 shows the transmission and distribution (T&D) losses of electricity 
including the US and selected EU nations as of 2008. The T&D loss remain high in 
the UK and is in line with Canada as compared to its European counterparts like 
Germany, Spain, France and Italy. This is mainly because of the relatively old grid 
in the UK than other countries. A significant proportion of the existing UK grid was 
constructed in the late 1950s and between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s 
(POST, 2007). Grid assets typically have a design life of about 40 years which 
implies that the UK grid have reached and surpassed their design lives. Older and 
decaying electricity network infrastructure can lead to higher system failure rates 
and losses implying increased maintenance and repair costs. It is expected that UK 
network companies will need to spend more on assets replacements over the next 
two decades to ensure an efficient management of the network (Hammond and 
Waldron, 2008). Moreover, the impacts of old network infrastructure on network 
losses are also high in other EU countries and remains to be adequately addressed. 
Furthermore, the figure further suggests that there might be a weak correlation 
between network losses and population density.  
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The treatment of losses across the regulated transmission and distribution 
network also explains the varying amount of losses in these countries. For 
example, Finland has no regulatory incentives or incentive mechanism to address 
losses while in France regulatory incentives only exists for theft at the distribution 
level. Explicit regulation of losses ex-ante can improve the performance of the 
grids by reducing network losses ex-post. 
 
 
Figure 3: T&D losses among some advanced economies 
Source: Adapted from MIT (2011) 
 
The above discussed set of indicators provides important insights on the 
performance of the electricity networks based on the quality of supply. However, 
these are ex-post indicators and their analysis is only useful after network failure 
and outages occur due to exceptional and normal events. In contrast, the primary 
objective of the European Commission (EC) is to design such energy policy 
measures that are conducive to minimizing the failures and power outages at a 
first place. This requires ex-ante risk assessment of the networks and designing 
appropriate prevention measures to counter these risks beforehand. In fact, such 
ex-ante risk analysis can be the first step towards creating a reliable, robust and 
resilient European grid. Hence, we apply the risk assessment matrix designed in 
Section 3 to assess the various risks that the electricity network currently faces in 
the UK and France as an example. Such matrix can be used to assess the network 
risks on other European countries lurching towards greater market liberalization 
and network interconnectedness.  
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4.1 The UK Context 
Economic risks to the networks are high in the UK due to lack of investment in new 
grid infrastructure and growth and variation in loads causing power quality risks. 
The topographical risks the UK network faces from severe weather conditions is 
moderately high. Likewise, the technical risks to the networks due to the adoption 
of new generation technologies and new technologies such as electric vehicles, 
smart grids can be considered to be weakly moderate. However, these risks are 
likely to increase in the future due to the wider adoption of new technologies and 
increased production of electricity from renewable energy sources. Similarly, UK is 
considered to face low network risks from terrorism and social riots currently. We 
assign a value to these risks based on a subjective assessment. The quantification 
of these risks is also supported by an earlier risk assessment study by Hammond 
and Waldron (2008).  
 
Risks Aspects LOW 
(1-3) 
MODERATE 
(4-7) 
HIGH 
(8-10) 
Economic  inadequate investments, 
demand factors 
  9 
Technical  distributed generation, 
new technologies 
 4  
Topographical  weather, natural 
calamities 
 7  
Social  terrorism, political 
instability, civil unrest 
3   
Table 7: Risk assessment score for UK 
 
Therefore, overall networks risks for UK = (9+4+7+3)/4 = 5.75  
 
4.2 The French Context 
The modernization of the electricity networks remains a priority in France. Hence, 
the economic risks of under-investment are also high in France though not as high 
as in the UK. This is because the UK has one of the oldest grid infrastructures in 
Europe. Energy diversity is currently less of a concern in the French electricity 
supply system as the country relies on nuclear energy implying the dominance of 
one fuel, once technology and a small number of related designs (Bazilian and 
Roques, 2008). In such regards, the system is secure and robust to external 
political, technological and economic events although the system may be probe to 
generic technical faults. Hence, technical risk is low in France. The topographical 
risks from extreme weather can also be considered low in France. On the other 
hand, the risks of terrorist attacks on electricity networks can be high in France 
due to the heavy reliance on nuclear technology. 
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Risks Aspects LOW 
(1-3) 
MODERATE 
(4-7) 
HIGH 
(8-10) 
Economic  inadequate investments, 
demand factors 
  8 
Technical  distributed generation, 
new technologies 
3   
Topographical  weather, natural 
calamities 
3   
Social  terrorism, political 
instability, civil unrest 
 5  
Table 8: Risk assessment score for France 
 
Therefore, overall network risks in France = (8+3+3+5)/4= 3.8 
 
Does this imply that the French networks are more secure (reliable, robust and 
resilient) than the UK ones? The answer may be ‘yes’ considering the data on the 
minute lost per year, the number of interruptions and the T&D losses. Our network 
risks score also support the claim. However, a cross-country comparison becomes 
more authentic by reflecting country-specific characteristics into account. This can 
be done by ranking the country specific risks and assigning the weight accordingly 
in our case. Assuming that the first ranked risk is weighted 4, the second 3, the 
third 2 and last one 1, we obtain the following scores: 
 
Weighted overall network risks for UK: 
{(4*9) + (3*7) + (2*4) + (1*3)}/ (4+3+2+1) = 6.8 
 
Likewise, weighted overall network risks for France: 
{(4*8) + (3*5) + (2*5) + (1*5)}/ (4+3+2+1) = 6.2 
 
The weighted score suggests that the French networks are relatively more secured 
than the UK networks by a small margin. Such an ex-ante risk assessment 
methodology can be an important starting point for policymakers in the face of 
uncertainty and scarcity of tools to assess security in networks. However, ex-ante 
risk assessment tends to rely on the availability of information while the survey 
methods can be costly as well. The accuracy of results is not guaranteed as some 
bias may exist. On the other hand, ex-post network security assessment (such as 
blackouts) can produce reasonable results with reasonable informational 
requirement. Nonetheless, the process can still be costly. It is also necessary that 
risk assessment should be done on a timely basis as risks are generally transient as 
market and conditions evolves. The risks tend to appear, disappear and reappear 
due to changes in market condition, technological developments and political 
environment as in the European context.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
The quest for reliable, robust and resilient electricity networks remains a priority 
among the European Union members. The European networks are facing new risks 
in the face of rapid market liberalisation and growing market interconnections. As 
such, the paper does not consider market liberalisation and interconnections as 
sources of risk but rather a default conditions that the industry was destined to 
emerge through. The new risks are classified under economic risks, technical risks, 
topographical risks and social risks thereby allowing us to account for exceptional 
events in the European context. It also suggests that factors exogenous to the 
sector are creating new risks to the sector post 1990. We qualitatively and 
quantitatively analyse these risks using an ex-ante risk assessment methodology.  
 
Our analysis suggests that economic risks of under-investment and rising 
electricity demand are one of the biggest risks facing the European electricity 
networks along with the risks of natural calamities and severe weather conditions. 
The transition towards smart grids and increasing digitalization of the grid imply 
new cyber security threats facing the European electricity networks. The 
protection of the networks against exceptional events and threats will require the 
adoption of sophisticated technologies and system design and planning which does 
not exist in many European grids. The obsolete system layout of power plants 
under centralised structures will require additional substation sites while the 
existing traditional tools of power delivery planning and engineering may not be 
effective in current problems of aged equipment, and modern deregulated loading 
levels. The high penetration of renewables in the grid will require detailed system 
planning coupled with accurate resource and load forecasting across Europe in the 
transition towards a low carbon economy.  
 
Hence, the planning, engineering and operating system using concepts and 
methodologies that worked under vertically integrated market structure cannot be 
suitable under a deregulated and liberalised industry structure when most of the 
electricity networks remain vertically unbundled from the potentially competitive 
segments. More emphasis should be placed towards energy efficiency to manage 
the growing economic risks of increasing electricity demand in the European 
electricity markets. Our study also shows that an ex-ante risk assessment 
technique that takes country-specific risks into account can be a useful risk 
assessment tool to policymakers considering the uncertainty and paucity of risk 
assessment tools.  
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As electricity networks in Europe remain regulated natural monopolies, it is 
evident that the system relies on the regulatory framework in place to embrace the 
new risks from natural, accidental and malicious threats in the mechanism design 
and to stimulate innovation in power systems and electricity markets. Preventing 
against the risks arising from the integration of the different innovations such as 
smart grids, smart metering, electro mobility and storage is likely to be the hardest 
challenge for European regulators in the next future. Nonetheless, the coordination 
among network regulators of the EU countries is essential to prevent against the 
exceptional threats as these regulatory regimes have different priorities and focus. 
Hence, the future of the risks and threats facing the European electricity networks 
is vastly linked to the future of the network regulation in Europe. 
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Appendix: 
 
Causes of outages Impact 
Percentage 
Major events 80.6% 
Trees 5.6% 
Distribution equipment failures 4.0% 
Other 2.6% 
Planned interruptions 1.3% 
Acts of public 1.2% 
Weather related 1.1% 
Transmission outages 1.1% 
Lightning 1.1% 
Substation outages 0.9% 
Animals 0.5% 
Generation Outages 0.0% 
Table A: Causes and percentage of outages in the US 
Source: Adapted from (Rouse and Kelly, 2011) 
 
 
 
Figure A: Number of unplanned Interruption including all events  
(interruptions per year) 
Source: Adapted from CEER (2008) 
